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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
0~-,

THE

State of Utah
CLIFTON BURR, ET. AL.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

vs.

No. 7995

RALPH E. CHILDS,
Defendant and
Respondent.

APPELLANr·s BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Ralph E.
Childs a general contractor, to perform work and labor
upon a building known as the Union High School, Roosevelt, Utah. This building is one that was classified as a
public works under the provisions of Section 34-12-6,
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tT.l .A. l!f>:l, in that it wa~ to be paid for in whole by
1

pnblit· moni<'~ and was constructed under the direction
and <·oJd rol or a political subdivision or district of the
~tat<·, ll:tllll'l~, tl11• school distri<~t. NOTE: (The com]daint in tl1i~ <·a~e citl'd the statutory provisions of the
Hl.t.:: r .<~.A.~ hmv<·\·<·•· the identical statutes are now set
forth in the 1!f.>:: 1· .C. A. and statutory references in this
hril'f will IH· to the 1953 U.C.A.)
.\t that ti11H' and at all tiJnf~s thereafter, Section
::-t-1 :!-::, lT.C .. \. 1!J;,::, provided that all persons employed
on pnhli(' works should be paid not less than the prevailing rate of wages per hour for work of a similar nature
performed in the localit~·: and Section 34-12-8, U.C.A.
1953 provided that 40 hours constituted a working week
on all ~uch works and undertakings and that one and a
half ( Vf2) times the regular rate of pay would be paid
for all work performed by an individual or individuals
over 40 hours in one week.
The prevailing rate of wages per hour is the rate
determined h~· the Industrial Com1nission of Utah and
Rection 34-12-6, P.C.A. 1953, provides that their decision
in such matters shall be final.
On July 15, 1949, a list of prevailing rates of pay per
hour was published h~· the Industrial Commission and on
July 15, 1950, a new or revised list of rates was likewise
established and published h~· the Industrial Commission.
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had failed
to pa~· then1 either the prevailing hourly wage or overtime wage and they filed an action in the District
Court of the Fourth .Judicial District in and for the
County of lTtah on behalf of themselves and for
2
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~!~

all other~ :::;imilarly situated under the provisions of
Rule :23 ..:\ (3), rtah Rules of Civil Procedure, to which
the defendant filed a n10tion to dis1niss. The District
Court granted the 1notion to dis1niss on February 24,
1~lj~3 by a 1ninute entry and on ~{arch 18, 1953 by an
rnnended 1ninute entry stated that the reason for the
courts ruling was its belief that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause.

~>laintiffs
.-~~;he appeal

appealed; defendant then moved to dismi
on the ground it was prematurely taken.
- ·>n June 1st, 1953, remittitur issued out of the
.·~-:3upreme Court and on June 5th, 1953 the lm,ver cour
~':::~ntered a formal order of dismissal.
:S U ~l.MA.K Y U~' A.Klt U MENr_r
~r-:

11'3

: ·>·=

The question involved herein has not been heretofore detennined in this state. However it has been raised
in other jurisdictions and the authority of an employee
to sue has been sustained on at least three different
theories.

:~

1. General liability created by statute without providing for a remedy, may be enforced by appropriate
common-law remedy.

f}fi

2. That the employee may sue as a 3rd party beneficiary.

J:

~][r

~m[~
~~

3. That the failure to comply with the statute
creates a tort liability.
ARGUMENT
1. General liability created by statute without pro'l:idin!f for a remedy may be enforced by appropriate
common-law remedy.
Chapter 12 of Title 3-1, U.C.A. 1953, does not provide
3
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for any action or .remedy by the eutployed individual.
The only proposed procedure for violations is contained
1n Section 34-12-5, U.C.A. 1953, which provides:
"It shall be the duty of such public body awarding the contract, and its officers and agents, to take
cognizance of complaints of all violations of the
provisions of this act cormnitted in the course of the
execution of a contract. When in their opinion the
provisions of this act have been violated it shall
be the duty of the 1nembers of the said board to make
a written report of such violation to the industrial
commission of the state of Utah who shall, upon
giving notice to the said contractor, finally determine whether such violations have been committed
and in the event that they so find, after proper hearing, the said industrial commission shall make an
order authorizing the said board to withhold and
retain from the contract price a sum equal to the
amount of the penalties assessed against the said
contractor. The sum so withheld and retained by the
board shall be by the said board promptly paid over
to the industrial commission of the state of Utah.
From the sum retained and withheld by virture of
the order of the industrial commission, there shall
first be deducted and paid over to the several employees, workmen or mechanics, who have not received by the prevailing rates as provided for by
this act, a sum equal to the difference of the sum
that they have actually received and the sum they
would have become entitled to, if they had been paid
the prevailing rate. The balance of the sun1 remaining shall be paid over to the industrial commission
4
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for the purpose of establishing a fund to enforce
the provisions of this net, and the said n1onies shall
be coYered into the ~tate treasury, and the state
trea~ urer shall be the custodian of the said fund,
and all disbursenwnts therefrom shall be paid by
hi1n upon Youcher~ authorized by the industrial comIni~sion of rtnh and signed by a member of the
connni~sion and the secretary thereof."
The aboYe quoted section imposes a duty upon
the public body to report violations, but nowhere
is there set forth any duty upon the individual
"\Yorkinan deprived of his statutory protection to report
to the school board and nowhere does it state that his
right to recover is conditional upon his petitioning the
school board and then bringing an action in mandamus to
cmnpel them to file a complaint with the Industrial ComInission if they fail to act.
If it be maintained that the only remedy provided
for the correction of statutory violations is contained in
Chapter 12, then it must follow that no remedy exists.
The Utah Supreme Court in Logan City v. Ind.
Comm. of Ftah, 85 U. 131, 39 P. 2 769, had before it a case
that determined that issue. There the individual employees filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission
alleging non-payment of the prevailing wage rates. The
statute, Laws of lTtah 1933, c. 39, section 4 is identical
to 34-12-5, F.C.A. 1953, and is set forth verbatim in the
opinion. rrhe Tndu~trial Commission found that the employ<><>~ had not heen properly paid and ordered an
award; Logan Cit~T appealed. The Supre1ne Court speaking through Straup, C. J. overruled and nullified the
5
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onl<·r ol' thP lndu~trial Commission saying at page 771:
· • rl,lw di~po~ition of the case does not require a
('Oil~id(•ration ol' all the points urged, for that the
('Olllllli~~ion, a~ we tl1ink, wa~ without jurisdiction to
h<·ar or d<'1<'nnine sw·l1 a controversy as here pre~<·nt<'d, for nei tlier hy th<~ "Industrial Commission"
uor "\Vorkmen':-; Colllpensation Act," R.S. Utah
l~l:t~, titl<· ·H-1-1 <'1 :-;eq., nor b~· Laws of Utah 1933,
<'. :~!), lwn·tol'on· referred to, is any such power confern·d on the <·<,Jmnission. The controversy so preHenh·<l involYPs a <li:-:pute, as to the amount of com]Wn~ation to which the persons so employed by the
<"it~· are entitled. 'Vhat is so presented is in the
nature of a proceeding or action to recover compensation for work and labor performed. By the cit~T
it is contended that those rendering the service were
paid in full in accordance with an agreement entered
into between them and the city. On the other hand,
those performing sneh service, while admitting or
not disputing payment in full in accordance with
the agreement, assert that under the law they were
entitled to additional cmnpensation and prayed for
an order requiring the city to pay it. The matter
thus affected individual rights and interests of those
involved in the controversy the same as in any action
or proceeding where one is claiming and demanding
compensation for services rendered and performed,
which to hear and determine invokes judicial action
and power. The con11nission is no such tribunal
authorized to exercise such a function or power. It
chiefly is an adn1inistrative body, and while in the
exercise of its functions it is required to pass on
6
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-~::"·

fad~ and to determine it~ aetion by thP !'ad~ l'ound.
in a sen~~:· exercising in such n'~lw<'t a qua~i judicial
function, a function lying midwa~· lwtwPPn Ininisterial and judicial functions, ~·d, it i~ not clothed
with power to exercisP judicia 1 ad~ or functions to
deride or ndjndieate rights of persons or property
in specific ea~P~ "'here such rights and the demanded
relief are the basis of the action or proceeding.
rnder our Constitution. art. 8. Section l, all judicial
power i~ vested in the Senate sitting as a court of
impeaclnnent. and in the Supre1ne and district courts
and justices of the peace and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established
h:~ law. As 1nay be established by law means as
provided by statute creating a "court," etc. The
Industrial Con1n1ission is not such or any court. It,
as created h:~ the statute, being an administrative
board or emmnission, any attempt to confer on it
the exercise of judicial powers and functions is
futile. and violative of the constitutional provision
referred to. It is unnecessary to now determine
whether section 4 of the Laws of Utah 1933 is or
is not in violation of such provision, for that the
presented case does not fall within such section. It
is enough to determine, as we do, that the power of
the com1nission invoked and exercised hy it is judicial in character, and that no such power is or may
be conferred upon it.''

The Supreme Court did not say that the application
"·as procedurally defective and that the men could not
apply to the cmmnission directly.
The Supre1ne Court did 11ot

~a~,

that the jurisdiction

7
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of tlw <'tllllllli~~ioll could only be invoked by an application by the Puhli<~ hody awarding the work.
'l'lt~• ~upn·tnP Court did say that the Industrial
( 'tllttttti:-;:-;ion lw·k<'d the power to perfol'ln the acts perlllittt·d h~· tit<' stat ut<~ and that it could not assume jurisdid ion and tnalw an award.

'I' It<· lat'k of po\\'<~ r is a matter of substance. It must
follow that th<· ~anw lack of power would exist regardless
of tit<' pn~t·<'dural approach and that as a result if no
powpr <'xi:-;b in the courts to hear and determine this
<"oHtro\'<'r:-;y then the purpose and the intent of the legislation is defeated.

The leading ease on the theory that general liability
t'reated by statute without providing for a remedy may
be enforced hy appropriate common-law remedy is that
of Cit:· of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P.
2d ll 7!J. In that case the plaintiff sued for wages due
from defendant for Garcia and Salazar which were as~ig-ned to the plaintiff. It was alleged that by statute
Garcia was entitled to be paid $-! per day and only
received $3.20 and that Salazar was siinilarly paid. Both
men accepted the lesser sum and later filed a written
demand which wa~ refused. Defendant defended on the
ground that the statute did not expressly give a right of
action to the laborer to recover the difference between
what was paid him and what he should have been paid.
In that case the court at page 1177 stated:
"If the strict rule as contended for be applied,
we would have the situation in this case of the Legislature giving a right with one hand, and denying a
remedy for an invasion thereof with the other. It
8
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!C::

i:s abo a general rule t hn t. in determini11p; t ht> liH'aning of :sta tnh':s, we mn:st consider both t ht> Pvi 1 to
be rernedied and the rP:snlt whieh the LPp;i~latnre
de:si rP:s to reach. \Ye ha VP dP:seribed tlw pnrpo~P of
the rnininnun \Hlg'<.' law in State v .•Jaa~tad, supra,
a:s follows:
· · ~lininnun wage law:s, increasingly prevalent in
recent years. are obviously, and generally avowedly,
based upon the theory that it is a n1atter of general
and public concern that wage-earners should not
haYe the amount of their earnings determined solely
by inten:se cmnpetition under the law of supply and
demand, which. as history has shown, frequently
re:sult:' in a general deterioration of the physical
and nwral stamina of a nation, and that human labor
i:s not a comn1odity in the sense that material products are, but is something higher and different,
and it therefore follows that the workers are not to
be considered as mere machines to be run at high
speed with the least possible expense, and then
scrapped as their usefulness is exhausted, but are
an integral and vital part of society itself, and
society must, for its own sake, if not for theirs, see
that they are given the protection which they cannot
unaided secure for themselves. Such being the case,
the nwre enlightened Legislatures have determined
that the state will, as a matter of public policy, fix a
wage below which it will not go, and the National
Industrial Heeover~, Act ( 48 Stat. 195) is endeavoring, h~, one rneans or another, to extend the principle
to private business.''
In concluding its discussion of this problern the court
9
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think we should apply to such a statute the
]>l'ilwipl<' ~tat<'d in Pollard v. Baile~·, 20 Wall. (87
r'":•)() ,.. )'"' 22 l . ·'". . "'_, · ) .~_
, ;>:.. . 1,
L. Ed. 376, as follows:
'' \\' P

'' .\ ~·t·nPral lial,ility created by statute without
a n·tltt·d~· may he enforced by an appropriate common-law action."
rl'he t·ourt in Filardo v. Foh~~· Bros., Inc., et al. 279
:217, 7S X.E. :2(1 -t~O had a case where the employee
"a~ ~ming for over-titiH~ at the rate of llf2 times his hourI~· rat<·. .\ ~tatute provided for a maximum of 8 hours
work a day and that ~u('h over-time pay should be awarded for an~· hours worked over the aforesaid 8 hours. The
jury found plaintiff had worked 1172 over-time hours
and ga YP the plaintiff judgment for $2492.36 with intPrP~t. The appellate court reversed the judgment and
dismissed the complaint because the statute didn't give
the en1ployee the right to sue. The Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court saying at page 482:
~. Y.

''There can be little question that the statute
was passed for the benefit and protection of the laborer and, in such a case, a party who has ''suffered
from a disregard and violation of the duty (imposed
b)· statute) has a cause of action for his damages
against the one who has disregarded his duty,'' even
though the statute does not explicitly provide for
such a re1nedy. Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe
Co., 243 N.Y., 458, 154 N.E. 309, 311; see, also,
Bruce's Juices v. A1nerican Can Co., 330 U.S. 743,
751, 67 S. Ct. 1015, 1019 ~ D 'Oench, Duhn1e & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation, 315 U.S. 447,
10
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-!3(i--l~)~, li:2 ~. Ct. ti7ti, (i7S, ti7~). Sli

L. l£d. !()(). With
the benefieial purposes ot' the ~tatnte so nutnifest,
if plaintiff may not ~nP to enforeP it, the benefits
accorded would indeed be empty and illusory. He
would find hilnself in thl• position of having been
giYen a benefit he i~ unable to enjoy, a right he is
helpless to enforce.
Analogously, ::;tate nnnnnun1 \\'age laws have
been interpreted to permit suit by an aggrieved employee to recover the wages therein specified, though
the statute merely made payment at less than the
specified rate criminally punishable and did not expressly grant a right of civil action. See MeN ulty
v. City of X e,,~ York, 238 N.Y. 29, 143 N.E. 781; City
of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. 2d
1175; cf. Austin v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 113,
179 X.E. 313; Cmnpbell v. City of New York, 128
:Jiisc. 382, 219 N.Y.S. 131.
In an alrnost identical case in 1949, the Supreme
Court of Alabama in Boggs v. Kershaw, Butler Engineers, :25:2 Ala. 265, 40 S. 2d 320 sustained the right of an
employee to bring suit and on page 323 of their opinion
cited Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., et al., 279 N.Y. 217,
78 N.E. 2d -!8:2 where the New York court stated:
''While the statute does not in so many words
grant to the e1nployee a cause of action if such compensation is not received, it is settled that such
remedial legislation is to be given a liberal construction to effectuate it:-; purpose and ai1n. See National
Labor Relations Board v. I-Iearst Publications, 322
U.S. 111, 129, 64 S. Ct. 851, 859, 88 L. Ed. 1170; South
11
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( 'lti<·ago ( 'oal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251,
:.!;l!l, ~(i0, (iO N. Ct. ;>44, :->4!>, K4 L. Ed. 732; Warner v.
Ooltra, :.!!l:~ l'.N. 155. 158, ;>G S. Ct. 46, 47, 79 L. Ed.
:.!;)4; \\'ailing v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 6 Cir.,
I ::4 1•'. :.!d 945."
allCI in Hto\'<•r v. \\'iu~ton Bros. Co. 185 Wash. -t16, 55
P. :.!d ~:.!1. tit<· <·ourt at page 824 said:

· · Tlt<·r<· i:-i a \\'ell-n~<·<Jgnize<l rule to the effect
that "·lt<•Jl(•\'<•r tl1<· law recognizes a right it gives a
n·rrH·d~· and this rule~ applies to statutory as well as
to l'OitlltlOn-law right~. 1 C.J. 986."
This is the law gt·n<·rall~· and is applied even though
wages alone an· not a~ked. Thus in Gabriel v. Borowy
(~fass.) 19-J-9, 83 X.E. 2d ..J-35, at page 438 the court
stated:
· · \Yl1ere a :'tatutory right is conferred upon a
elass of individuals as distinguished from the public at large but no remedy is provided by the statute
for the enforcement of the right, the right may be
asserted h~- any appropriate common law remedy
that is available. Otherwise, the right would be useless and illusory. Jeffrey v. Blue-Hill Turnpike
Corp., 10 ::\[as~. 368: Russell l\1:ills v. County Commissioners of Plymouth, 16 Gray 347; Attorney General Y. Williams, 17-l- ::\[ass. 476, 55 N.E. 77, 47 L.R.A.
314: Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 209 Mass.
489, 95 N.E. 876, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 797; West's Case,
313 l\iass. 146, -l-G N.E. 2d 760; Irving Trust Co. v.
l\{aryland Casnalt~- Co., 2 Cir., 83 F. 2d 16R, 111
A.L.R. 781; City of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz.
470, 52 P. 2d 1175; l\icNulty v. New York, 238 N.Y. 29
12
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1-!3 N.E. 7~1; ..:\bounader Y. StrohwPyer & Arpe Co.,
243 N.Y. -l5S, 15-l N.E. 309."

:.• h.,

The Labor Code of California, See. 1770-1775 is
identical to that of the ~tate of Utah exePpt that there is
no provision si1nilar to ~~4-1~-;'}. " 7 hile there are no cases
ari~ing- under these section~, there are two cases, Adams
Y. \Yolff, 190 P. ~d GG5 and Parker v. Bowron (1953) 254
P. ~d G. wherein it wa~ conceded that the employees had
the right to sue in their own nan1es. These cases arose
under the city charters of San Francisco and Los Angeles
respectiYely. The charter provisions are not set forth
in sufficient detail to be of help though the parts referred
to are con1parable to the State law. It is fair to assume
however that they are similar and that no statutory authority expressly permitting employees to sue existed.

2. The employee may sue as a 3rd party beneficiary.

....,-I
J.-

.-

... , ~ J ~
:.-i'-

J~Thi
~~·:1\;

In the case of Stover v. \Vinston Bros. Co. supra, the
plaintiff brought an action to recover wages pursuant to
a contract between the defendant corporation and the
City of Seattle. The City of Seattle by ordinance had
fixed as a matter of public policy the wages and conditions of labor on public works. These requirements were
incorporated into the contract for construction so that
the employees were protected by ordinance and also by
contract. The court held that the employees could sue
as third party beneficiaries saying at page 824:
''Here we have a situation known to the contracting parties which made it the duty of the contractor to pay the city wage scale to all workmen
who might he mnployed. The contract, by its ter1ns,
required such payment to a designated class and
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wa~

as <·x plicit as it possibly could be rnade at the
time it wa~ entered into. While, incidentally, the
l'ity might r<·<~eive benefits therefrom, its rnain purpm;e watoi, without douht, to provide to the workmen
au ad<·~ tuate wage."
"\\' tih full knowledge of what the obligation
t II<· <'Oil t rador, I' or a valuable consideration,
a.!.!,T<·<·d to }m~· l1is workmen when employed according to a :'JH•<·ifi<·d wage ~tale. Notwithstanding that
no workman was a part~r to the consideration, we
llln:-:t hold that all workmen were, by the contract,
g-iYPn a substantive right, the right to receive the
:-:pecified wage, "·hich right was a direct liability of
the eontractor to the workmen, and therefore the
worlnnen may sue on the contract in their own
right.''
wa:-;,

Thus in A us tin Bridge Co. v. Teague, 137 Tex. 119,
149 S.\V. 2d G7-t, there "·as a statute requiring that workmen engaged in doing or perfonning work on a public
project were to receive certain per diem wages. The
State Highway Commission was required to ascertain
the "general prevailing rate of per diem wages." The
statute made it mandatory for the contractor to pay not
less than the prevailing wage rates so fixed by the Commission. Defendant paid the plaintiff wages due as an
unskilled laborer, plaintiff, claiming he should have had
the wages for skilled labor, sued. He conceded that he
was not specifically authorized h~T statute to sue but the
court sustained the lower courts verdict for the plaintiff
maintaining at page 676:
"It is true that these ren1edies or provisions for
14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.•:~- .. -

--....:;)0

T'll':f--

the enforcen1ent of the ~tatntt~ may indirectly aid
workn1en in ~eenring the payment of the 1niniu1U1n
rate of wage~~ but we do not rPganl then1 as being
exelusiYe. Such provisions are penal in nature and
like all penal la "-~ wen~ intended as deterrents to
contractors not to pay less than the 1ninimum rate of
wages. Their enforce1nent, however, does not actually pay the 1ninimun1 rate of wages prescribed, which
is the pri1nary objective of the statute, and we can
conceive of no good reason why the legislature would
give worklnen the right to require a contractor of
public works to pay them a minimum rate of wages,
and then deny them the right to sue the contractor
for such wages. We think the Act contemplates the
authority of workmen to enforce their right to be
paid such wages by suit against the contractor."
"We are also of the view that appellee does
have the right to 1naintain this suit as a third party
beneficiary under the contract in suit. The provisions of the Act with respect to payment of minimulTI wages are required to be inserted in the public
works contract and become a part of it. They were
so inserted in the instant case. Such provisions of
the contract are for the benefit and protection of the
laborer, and the generally accepted rule is that a
contract 1nade by two parties for the benefit of a
third party may be enforced by the suit of the latter.
Such is the holding in Hearn v. Ralph Sollitt & Sons
Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 93 S.W. 2d 551, wherein
the similar federal wage law was involved, and the
eourt construed the contract as authorizing the laborer to sue thereon as a third party beneficiary.''
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rrhe New York court in Fata v. S. A. Healy Co. 289
N.Y. 401, ·Hi N.E. ~<l 339, which was followed in Filardo
v. l~'oiP~' Bro:-:. ~!)7 N.Y. 217,78 N.E. 2d 480, followed this
dod rinP a~ it i:-; :-:tate<l in the second paragraph of the
R~·llalllt:-: in the Fata case:
'' 1\ n <·mployP<~ could maintain common law
:wtion a~ain:-:t <·tnplo~·<~r for breach of contract bet W<·<·u <'tup}<,~·<'r and <·ity':-: agency, which required
<·lltplo~·<·J' to pa~· wages at least at prevailing rate
fix<'d in a<·<·ordam·p with statute as stated in schedule annexed to contract, as against contention that
:-:tatutor~· remedy was exclusive. Labor Law, Section
~~0. :-:uhd. ~.a~ amended hy Laws 1935, c. 300."

3.

That the faif,n·e to comply with the statute

rreates a tort liability.

The courts of Kentucky have approached the problem fron1 a different standpoint. In Consolidated Tel.
Co. v. Stevens, J{y. 1943, 293 Ky. 313, 168 S.W. 2d 1012,
a female telephone operator sued for over-time basing
her claim on state statutes setting minimum hours and
minimum wages for women. She was not working or
covered by a formal contract. The Supreme Court sent
the case back for further proceedings saying at page
1013:
'' Frmn our consideration of the allegations of
the petition, we are led to assume that the appellee
misconceived the nature and character of her action,
as one based on contract, where seeking recovery of
extra compensation for over-time hours of like
character of service rendered her employer, without
contract or agreement had with it that she was to
16
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be paid therefor, and that her netion, ~l'Pking cmnpen~ation or damagP~ sustained by rPa~on of tlw
defendant·~ violation of the penal ~ta tntr lH'l'P involved, was properly of ex delicto character and
authorized bY sections -lSGGb-~ (KRS 337.380) and
-!767 a-17 (KRS 337-360), J(entncky Statutes, or
chapter 103 of the penal statute of the Session Acts
of 1938. ''
CONCLUSION
Looking again to the Logan City case, it will be
observed that the court clearly implied that the problem
of collecting wages and enforcing the statutory rights
conferred upon an e1nployee is a judicial problem and
involves judicial action. This is in entire accord with the
principles above set forth. Clearly if the District Court
be sustained we have a case where a right, benefit and
protection is afforded that would be unenforceable. It
is requested therfor that the order of dismissal be reversed and that the case be remanded for further proceedings according to law.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID S. KUNZ
DEAN N. CLAYTON
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
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